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ABSTRACT 
 
The momentum phenomenon is one of the most well documented anomalies in financial 
research. However, the driving forces behind the anomaly have yet to be indisputably 
recognized. The purpose of this Master’s thesis is to investigate whether return 
continuation is derived from a situation where investors have heterogeneous beliefs or 
receive heterogeneous information. The dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts is 
used as a proxy for heterogeneity of beliefs concerning a firm’s fundamentals. The basic 
methodology is adopted from Verardo (2009). 
 
The contribution of this study to prior research is to examine the relationship between 
momentum profits and heterogeneous beliefs in different states of the market. This 
method allows for a closer investigation of the state-dependent properties of the 
phenomenon. The research period ranges from 2002 to 2015 and is divided into three 
separate sub-samples according to the prevailing market state: pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis periods. The research data consists of monthly stock returns of S&P 500 survivor 
stocks. The main independent variable, dispersion (DISP), is the coefficient of variation 
of analyst forecasts of earnings for the end of the current or the next fiscal year. 
 
The purpose of the study is to provide an empirical link between momentum profits and 
heterogeneous beliefs using the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as the main variable to 
measure the relation between the diffusion of forecasts per given stock and return 
continuation in a portfolio setting and in a time-series regression framework. The results 
from portfolio analysis are further tested with multivariate time-series regressions 
featuring the Fama-French three-factor model to assess whether covariance with 
possible risk factors has an impact on momentum returns. The findings of this study 
confirm only partially those of previous research papers. The portfolio analysis results 
suggest that the momentum-dispersion strategy works only during a “normal” state of 
the market. During a crisis period, the strategy is unable to yield positive returns and the 
profitability pattern is reversed in the aftermath of a momentum crash. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Momentum, heterogeneous beliefs, behavioral finance 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The momentum phenomenon, also known as price reversal and continuation, is 
the predictive power that past prices have on future returns. In other words, 
stock returns exhibit autocorrelation in various time periods. The term 
momentum refers to the short-run tendency of prices being positively 
autocorrelated in a time period that lasts less than one year. Long-term price 
reversals occur because prices are negatively autocorrelated in a period of three 
to five years. The predictable power of past prices is directly contradictory to 
the efficient market hypothesis in its weakest form. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993, 
Fama 1970.) 
 
It has been over 30 years since the momentum investing strategy was 
discovered by academics (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993, Asness 1994). Since then it 
has received a great deal of attention and sparked academic interest across the 
board in the field of finance, as there have been an abundance of studies 
documenting its presence and efficacy extending across over 40 countries and 
more than a dozen asset classes (Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen 2013). Geczy 
and Samonov (2013) provide evidence of momentum in U.S. stocks with a time 
period ranging from as early as 1801 to 2010, calling their research “the world’s 
longest backtest”. While momentum is acknowledged as one of the most stable 
and extensively documented anomalies, there is ongoing debate regarding the 
causes behind momentum. A number of both traditional and behavioral 
theories have since emerged trying to justify the abnormal returns the 
momentum strategy continues to generate (Asness, Frazzini, Israel & 
Moskowitz 2014). 
 
The proponents of the traditional finance paradigm believe in Von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. The traditional 
neoclassical view on financial models is rationality based – risk-averse investors 
utilize all available information effectively and their preferences conform to 
expected utility. They apply optimal statistical procedures to form their beliefs 
about the markets and assets. Using all publicly available information, investors 
are supposed to be able to make instantaneous and unbiased forecasts about 
future value of assets, which would lead to market prices fully reflecting the 
true value of assets at all times. (Fama 1970.) 
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Momentum, the tendency of past performance to continue in the short run and 
revert in the long run, challenges the credibility of the efficient market 
hypothesis especially since it is yet to be captured by any traditional asset 
pricing model. The proponents of the efficient markets have come up with a 
number of risk-based explanations for the anomaly. Most notably theories 
involving an undiscovered risk factor accounting for the abnormal returns 
(Schwert 2003), such as a common global risk factor and liquidity risk (Asness, 
Moskowitz & Pedersen 2013).  
 
Behavioral finance is the paradigm that studies the financial markets using 
models that take into account the human factor. The advocates of this paradigm 
believe market operators to be imperfectly rational and their views are heavily 
rooted in studies on human cognitive psychology. Researchers studying the 
field of behavioral decision-making have produced a significant amount of 
evidence against individuals behaving as if they have Von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences or form judgments based on Bayesian principles. The 
biases that people have tend to cumulate into systematic errors that may 
account for much of the occurring anomalous phenomena that traditional risk-
based models are unable to explain, such as the momentum anomaly. (Shefrin 
2005.) 
 
Heterogeneous beliefs are the product of various sets of traders forming 
different expectations about the future prices of assets. There are both rational 
and behavioral theories striving to explain the phenomenon. Heterogeneous 
beliefs may derive from receiving heterogeneous information or receiving 
identical signals, but interpreting them in different ways (Banerjee, Kaniel & 
Kremer 2009). One of the major causes of heterogeneous beliefs is sub-optimal 
learning of agents on the financial markets. 
 
 
1.1. Prior research 
  
The most notable previous research article related to this thesis is Verardo’s 
(2009) study on heteregonous beliefs and momentum profits. The study is 
conducted with monthly data from U.S. stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ indices during the period of 1984 to 2000. Using the dispersion of 
analyst forecasts as a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs, Verardo shows in a 
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portfolio setting and with predictive cross-sectional regressions that momentum 
profits are significantly larger for portfolios with higher levels of heterogeneity 
of beliefs. This suggests that there is a positive relationship between forecast 
dispersion and autocorrelation in returns. Verardo’s findings are in line with 
the overreaction and self-attribution model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), the underreaction to public news model of Hong et al. 
(2000) and the parameter uncertainty model of Lewellen and Shanken (2002). 
 
Other notable studies include the work by Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and 
Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009). Allen et al. examine the role of high-order 
expectations in an asset-pricing context with a REE model of financial markets 
and show that differences in high-order beliefs lead to price drifts. Banerjee et al. 
show theoretically that heterogeneous opinions paired with uncertainty about 
other traders’ opinions create price drift in a dynamic setting. Hong, Lim and 
Stein (1999) propose that relevant information is scattered between numerous 
individuals and cognitive limitations prevent investors from interpreting what 
others know solely with data on market prices. This causes information to 
diffuse slowly, resulting in momentum. The authors also show that the 
momentum effect is most prevalent for low-attention stocks, such as small 
stocks and stocks with less analyst coverage. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the study and intended contribution 
 
How investors process information and update their beliefs is a central element 
of market efficiency, because it is directly reflected in asset prices and trading 
volume. The role of learning on the financial markets is increasingly important 
due to the exponentially increasing availability of information in today’s world. 
The processing of information is both difficult to observe in an empirical setting 
as well as a broad concept comprising of different dimensions, such as 
attention, decision-making under uncertainty and dispersion of beliefs.  
 
The purpose of this study is to strive to establish a link between return 
continuation and heterogeneous beliefs in S&P 500 survivor stocks to show that 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts contains information that can be used to predict 
future stock returns. The study replicates that of Verardo (2009) to some extent, 
as the dispersion of analyst forecasts is used as a measure of investors’ 
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heterogeneous beliefs about a firm’s fundamentals. The time period ranges 
from 2002 to 2015 and is divided into three sub-periods: pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis periods. The purpose of the so-called sample split test is to illustrate 
the performance of both momentum and momentum-dispersion trading 
strategies in different market conditions. The results from portfolio analysis are 
further tested with multivariate time-series regressions featuring the Fama-
French three-factor model to assess whether covariance with possible risk 
factors has an impact on momentum returns. 
 
The contribution of this study to the existing literature is to provide a similar 
study to Verardo (2009) with newer data: the research methods are analogous to 
some extent, but the data is substantially different. The difference stems from 
the fact that the chosen time period features three distinct market states, where 
as the original study was conducted with only one time-period that did not 
feature any major momentum crashes. The sample period in this study is split 
into three separate periods to highlight the dependence of momentum returns 
on the state of the market, as well as its effect on the interdependence between 
return continuation and dispersion of beliefs. This analysis provides valuable 
insight on the varying, state-dependent properties of the relationship between 
return continuation and heterogeneous beliefs. 
 
 
1.3. Research hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses of this study are structured based on previous literature on the 
momentum trading strategy and its correlation with heterogeneous beliefs. 
According to previous research, the strategy should be more effective in the 
presence of belief heterogeneity regardless of the prevailing market situation. 
The first two hypotheses are designed according to this assumption: 
 
H1: The momentum strategy is able to generate positive absolute return in all 
states of the market. 
 
H2: Return autocorrelation in short-term cumulative individual stock returns is 
higher for stocks with a larger degree of heterogeneity of beliefs in all states of 
the market. 
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The subsequent hypotheses are more unique to this study and accentuate the 
novel contribution to the existing body of literature on the topic by focusing on 
the relationship between return continuation and heterogeneous beliefs across 
different states of the market. All hypotheses consider whether differences in 
beliefs exacerbate return continuation during specific sub-periods:  
 
H3: Momentum profits are higher for stocks characterized by higher dispersion 
of analyst forecasts during the pre-crisis period. 
 
H4: Momentum profits are higher for stocks characterized by higher dispersion 
of analyst forecasts during the crisis period. 
 
H5: Momentum profits are higher for stocks characterized by higher dispersion 
of analyst forecasts during the post-crisis period. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The first chapter is an introduction to the 
topic and the thesis as a whole, containing information about the research 
subject in question, its main themes and relevant earlier research findings, as 
well as the motivation, purpose and intended contribution of this study. The 
research hypotheses are also introduced in the first chapter. Chapter two is the 
first part of the theory section of the thesis and introduces the concept of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970) as well as other cornerstones of the 
neoclassical finance paradigm.  The third chapter focuses on the topic of 
heterogeneous beliefs. It begins with an introduction to the Bayesian theory of 
information updating and its modern approach in finance theory. The chapter 
also features a summary of the critique the theory has faced and the most 
significant known biases and violations related to it.  
 
The fourth chapter sheds light on the behavioral implications of non-Bayesian 
information updating on the financial markets and relevant and widely 
documented behavioral biases concerning limited attention and sub-optimal 
learning. Chapter five discusses the price and earnings momentum anomaly, 
introducing relevant prior research findings and discussion between both 
 14 
rational and behavioral explanations for the phenomenon. Special attention is 
focused on the relationship between heterogeneous beliefs and momentum.  
 
Chapter six begins the empirical part of the thesis by introducing the data and 
methodologies used in the research. Chapter seven presents the results from the 
empirical research along with analysis and interpretation of these results as 
well as discussion on how they compare with relevant prior research findings. 
Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis with a summary of the research 
findings and their implications.  
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2. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
 
The neoclassicist finance paradigm seeks to understand financial markets by 
models that feature rational agents. In this context, rationality stands for two 
things. Firstly, in the face of new information, agents update their beliefs 
correctly according to Bayes’ law. Secondly, based on those recently updated 
beliefs, agents make choices that are normatively acceptable according to the 
expected utility theorem. (Barberis & Thaler 2003: 1053.) 
 
Modern finance is built around the idea of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), according to which investors are unable to earn above-average returns 
without accepting above-average risks. Introduced by Eugene Fama in 1965, the 
hypothesis argues that prices are driven into their correct value by competing 
investors seeking abnormal profits. The investors themselves are not viewed as 
rational, but the markets are. In it’s simplest form, the EMH states that security 
prices fully reflect all available information. In his seminal thesis of 1965, Fama 
defines the concept of an efficient market as follows: 
 
“Independence of successive price changes is consistent with an “efficient” 
market, that is, a market where prices at every point in time represent best 
estimates of intrinsic values. This implies in turn that, when an intrinsic value 
changes, the actual price will adjust “instantaneously,” where instantaneously 
means, among other things, that the actual price will initially overshoot the new 
intrinsic value as often as it will undershoot it.” 
 
Fama stated the sufficient conditions for capital market efficiency: First, there 
are no transaction costs in trading securities. Second, all available information is 
available to all market participants without a cost. Third, all agree on the 
implications of current information for the current price and distributions of 
future prices of each security. (Fama 1970.) 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was formed on the bases of earlier research 
findings, most notably Kendall’s (1953) empirical studies on stock price 
behavior labeled ”the random walk model”. His studies were based on 
Bachelier’s (1901) earlier mathematical findings that the movement of stock 
prices follow a random, Brownian motion. Kendall examines 22 UK stock and 
commodity price series and concludes "in series of prices which are observed at 
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fairly close intervals the random changes from one term to the next are so large 
as to swamp any systematic effect which may be present. The data behave 
almost like wandering series." This was the first time that the near-zero 
correlation of price changes was demonstrated. 
 
Since the very first event studies, it has been empirically proven on numerous 
occasions that obtaining substantial profits can be made possible by early 
identification of new information. This is directly contradictory to the EMH. 
However, Jensen’s (1968) analysis of 115 mutual funds over the period 1955-
1964 concludes that even professionals were unable to “beat the market”, since 
any informational advantage they have is consumed by costs and fees, thus 
leading to his conclusion that efficient markets prevail as long as abnormal 
profits do not persist ex post trading costs. Some incentive is still left for 
security analysis, since it is widely accepted that efficient markets do not rule 
out small abnormal returns. Minor market efficiencies have to be accepted for 
the concept of the hypothesis to work. (Dimson & Mussavian 1998: 3-5.) 
 
 
2.1. Different forms of market efficiency 
 
In his review Fama (1970) divides work on market efficiency into three 
categories based on the information processing capabilities of the stock market 
as reflected in the prices of securities. The first one concerns how well past 
returns predict future returns. In his later review Efficient Capital Markets: II 
(1991) Fama broadens the scope of the first form of market efficiency. Where 
weak-form tests only address the forecast power of past returns, the new 
category now more generally labeled tests for return predictability includes such 
variables as dividend yield and interest rates. The cross-sectional predictability 
of returns – tests of asset pricing models and anomalies discovered – are also 
addressed. Seasonalities in returns and claims of excessive volatility are also 
considered, since they are proved to have an effect on return predictability. 
According to the theory, when the markets are efficient in the weak form, 
abnormal profits cannot be obtained by applying technical analysis. On the 
other hand, it is theoretically possible to identify misvalued stocks by practicing 
fundamental analysis. 
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Under the semi-strong form of efficiency, prices will fully reflect all obviously 
available public information and adjust to any new information instantaneously 
and in an unbiased manner. Any overreactions and underreactions are to cancel 
each other out. Only individuals with access to monopolistic information could 
expect higher than average investment returns. (Fama 1970.) The tests were 
renamed as event studies, since the main focus is on such events as 
announcements of annual earnings and stock splits, and how quickly they have 
an effect on security prices, using the market model or capital asset pricing 
model as the benchmark. (Dimson & Mussavian 1998: 3-5.) 
 
Finally, strong form tests concern whether some investors or groups with 
monopolistic access to information that is not reflected in market prices have an 
effect on security price formation. The tests were renamed in Efficient Capital 
Markets: II (Fama 1991) as tests for private information. In this theoretical context, 
if the strong form of market efficiency should prevail, no trader would be able 
to gain advantage on any sort of public or private information or research, thus 
making it impossible for investors to earn above-average returns without 
accepting above-average risks.  
 
 
2.2. Debate surrounding the EMH 
 
Empirical endeavor of testing the validity of the EMH began already in the 
early 1960s, even though the majority of the conducted studies seemed to 
further support the hypothesis, at least in the weak and semi-strong forms. 
However, there were a few important methodological issues pointed out. First, 
Kuhn (1970) granted a so-called “protective belt” for the prevailing paradigm in 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. An alternative paradigm will replace the 
prevailing paradigm only when mounting anomalies appear. This led the EMH 
dominating the academic scene in such proportions that any conflicting 
empirical studies were unlikely to become published. Additionally, it is 
nowadays being argued that the lacking of empirical evidence against the EMH 
in the 1960s was caused by a testing bias – market efficiency supported when 
the evidence is favorable and treated as part of the maintained hypothesis, 
insulated from falsification, when the evidence is unfavorable (Leroy 1989: 
1614). (Lee & Yen 2008: 308-310.) 
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Also, challengers of the EMH have found possible evidence that improper 
statistical methods have been applied in researches supporting the theory. 
Taylor (1982) discovered that the empirical results support a price-trend 
hypothesis instead of the random walk hypothesis when autocorrelation 
coefficient 𝑟 is replaced with the more powerful test statistic 𝑄! =   𝑛   ∙    𝑟!!. He 
found that other test statistics refute random behavior due to not being 
designed to be powerful when there are trends. His conclusion applies to the 
conventional time-domain, frequency domain and non-parametric runs 
statistics. (Taylor 1982: 57.) 
 
The fourth methodological issue is that empirical evidence against the validity 
of the hypothesis has been misinterpreted as support, most famously in Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll’s (1969) study, where their evidence indicated a gradual, 
steady price response prior to split announcements. If the markets had indeed 
been semi-strong effective, share prices would have reacted to information 
promptly instead of gradually within a few months creating post-split excess 
returns as high as 30%. Conducting studies on seemingly nominal instead of 
truly nominal events makes it impossible to prove that price movements are 
inconsistent with the EMH. (Lee, Yen 2008: 310-311.) 
 
Finally, it is to be noted that the definition of market efficiency has changed 
considerably since its establishment. However, it still remains the main source 
of controversy among the proponents of the two different schools of finance. 
Where as the advocates of the EMH focus on the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities as the main definition of efficient markets, proponents of 
behavioral finance tend to define it in a far more absolute manner, in terms of 
objectively correct prices that fully reflect all available information at all times 
(Shefrin 2005: 111). 
 
 
2.3. Traditional asset pricing models 
 
In textbooks with rational agents and frictionless markets the formation of stock 
prices is explained as follows: the current price of a share (𝑃!) is derived from 
the expected dividend (𝐷! ) plus the future price (𝑃! ) discounted at the 
opportunity cost of capital (𝜌). Any fluctuation in prices is explained with both 𝐷! and 𝑃! having uncertain expectations, affected by any news that concerns 
 19 
them. On top of that 𝜌 also changes over time, because the compensation that 
investors require for risky assets is not constant. (De Bondt 1993: 356-357.) 
 
In a rational asset valuation model, forecasts of 𝐷!  and 𝑃!possibly contain 
random error, but it is never regarded as predictable. When investors decide to 
trade their stocks in an efficient market they always receive fair value, and thus 
the timing of the transaction seldom has any effect on it. (De Bondt 1993: 356-
357.)  
 
The traditional neoclassical assumptions about asset pricing are rationality 
based. In these models investors have fully rational preferences that conform to 
expected utility. The expected utility model is composed of a set of probability 
beliefs and a utility function. Rational investors utilize information efficiently 
and base their beliefs on the application of optimal statistical methods. In 
traditional asset pricing models, utility functions are concave functions of 
wealth levels, with concavity indicating the investors’ risk aversion. (Shefrin 
2005: 1-12.) Since traditional asset pricing theorists view investors free from bias 
in their use of information, observed pricing phenomena is attributed to 
fundamental risk or time varying risk aversion (Shefrin 2005: 365). The most 
well known of the general equilibrium models of the pricing of capital assets is 
mean-variance formulation originally developed by Sharpe (1964) and Treynor 
(1961). 
 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium framework (REE) is used in the majority of 
asset pricing models. This means assumptions of individual rationality and 
beliefs that are consistent with the reality. To be able to figure out the correct 
distribution for the variables of interest, the agents need to have access to a 
sufficient amount of information and be able to process it accurately. (Barberis 
& Thaler 2003: 1053) 	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3. HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS 
 
Heterogeneous beliefs are the product of various sets of traders forming 
different expectations about the future prices of assets. There are both rational 
and behavioral theories striving to explain the phenomenon. Heterogeneous 
beliefs may derive from receiving heterogeneous information or receiving 
identical signals, but interpreting them in different ways (Banerjee, Kaniel & 
Kremer 2009). One of the major causes of heterogeneous beliefs is sub-optimal 
learning on the financial markets, which occurs when agents that face new 
information fail to update their beliefs according to the Bayesian principles 
described in this chapter. 
 
 
3.1. Bayesian information updating 
 
Initially discovered by the 18th century British mathematician Thomas Bayes, 
the Bayes’ law (alternatively Bayes’ rule or Bayes’ theorem) is a probability 
theory that describes the probability of an event based on related conditions. 
Also known as conditional probability or inverse probability, it provides a way 
to revise predictions in light of new or additional relevant evidence. 
 
I. J. Savage created the modern approach to the Bayesian paradigm when he 
combined it with the Neumann Morgenstern utility maximation theory of 1947 
into an axiomatized theory of decision-making under uncertainty. In his book 
The Foundations of Statistics (1954) he calls it “a highly idealized theory of the 
behavior of a ‘rational’ person with respect to decisions”. (Slovic Lichtenstein 
1970: 19-20.) 
 
The basic principles of the Bayesian approach are that (1) probability is an 
informed judgment and (2) that the Bayes’ theorem provides the optimal 
method for the revision of that judgment in the face of new information. Bayes’ 
theorem is a normative model that provides a distribution of probabilities 
concerning a possible event. In economics, this distribution is combined with 
the theory of maximizing one’s personal expected utility (Slovic & Lichtenstein 
1970: 19-20). 
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Agents face constant uncertainty about parameters in the financial markets and 
strive to learn about these parameters by observing data and acquiring new 
information. Bayesian updating is the cornerstone of learning on the financial 
markets. It describes how rational agents update their beliefs in the face of new 
information, in other words learn about the assets and market. Learning is an 
important feature of the financial markets, since most parameters in financial 
models are subject to it. Learning is related to many financial market 
phenomena, such as volatility and predictability of asset returns, price 
anomalies and trading volume. (Pástor & Veronesi 2009: 1-5.) 
 
In the neoclassical framework, agents utilize Bayesian techniques to formulate 
correct statistical judgments from the data at their disposal. When forming 
probability judgments, agents receive signals, which contain new information. 
They then consider it relative to their former beliefs, in other words the prior 
probability. After successfully implicating the new evidence into their prior 
belief, they have then formed the posterior probability. (Shefrin 2005: 15-32.) 
 
According to the Bayes law, P(A|E) is derived from P(D|F) and the ratio P(F) 
divided by P(D).  The equation is designed as follows (Shefrin 2005: 15-32): 
 
 P A E   =  P A P E AP E                                                                 
(1)                             =    Ρ(Α)Ρ(Ε|Α)Ρ Α Ρ Ε|Α + Ρ Α! Ρ Ε Α! 	  
 
P (A|E) = Conditional probability of an event 
P (A) = Base rate information 
P (E) = Signal 
 
 
Updating process in the financial markets features also the element of 
uncertainty, which can be described with variance. An agent’s prior beliefs 
about a figurative parameter θ are always normally distributed with mean θ! 
and variance σ!!. In line with the Bayes’ law, after observing a T number of 
signals the agent’s posterior beliefs are now normally distributed with mean θ! 
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and variance σ!! . The revised mean θ! is the precision-weighted average of the 
prior mean and the signal. The revised variance σ!!  becomes smaller with every 
new signal, because learning diminishes uncertainty. (Pástor & Veronesi 2009: 
1-2.) 	  
3.1.1. Signals 
 
Signals are any new pieces of information, spread through for example earnings 
announcements, the media and social circles. The salience of signals is a 
measure of their relative strength. Salient signals enhance the processing of 
information and perceptual readiness. Investors are prone to buying shares that 
have previously caught their attention, due to prior performance for example, 
because salient information facilitates recall. The weight of signals is measured 
by their statistical significance in relation to prior information. (Hirshleifer 2001: 
19-20.) 
 
In the context of Bayesian information updating, the magnitude of price 
response to unanticipated events is due to the amount of novel information and 
the relative precision of market participants’ prior and posterior expectations. 
Most classic pricing models are also based on the Bayesian assumption of the 
strength of the price impact of unanticipated news being relative to the 
precision of the signals presented in the news. (Hautsch & Hess 2004: 205-206.) 
 
 
3.1.2. Critique 
 
The Bayesian method of learning has long been regarded as an insufficient 
measure of how agents actually respond to new information and behave on 
financial markets. In addition to the method’s lack of predictive power, 
researchers have found false and incomplete assumptions about how the Bayes 
law can be applied in real life.  
 
Firstly, it has been noted that individual agents do not revise their beliefs in a 
uniform way. Secondly, there are a few biases that result from several agents 
systematically revising their beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the 
model. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found that individuals 
often overreact to new signals and ignore prior data, as well as make 
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predictions according to what they call a simple matching rule: "The predicted 
value is selected so that the standing of the case in the distribution of outcomes 
matches its standing in the distribution of impressions". They call it the 
representativeness heuristic. They also state that overreaction is further 
strengthened due to the fact that people do not moderate extreme predictions 
by predictability, thus violating a statistical principal. There is also evidence on 
finance professionals, such as analysts and forecasters, being susceptible to the 
overreaction bias. (De Bondt and Thaler 1985: 793.)  
 
3.2. Updating biases 
 
Bayesian updating is the sole rational method of information updating and 
learning on the financial markets. It is theoretically sound, but there are 
deviations from optimal behavior when tested with individuals. Kandel and 
Pearson (1995) provide empirical evidence to prove false the assumption that 
agents interpret information identically. Their findings of abnormal volumes 
associated with interim earnings announcements, unrelated to the degree of 
price changes, are inconsistent with most existing models in which agents share 
identical interpretation of signals. 
 
Researchers agree that suboptimal learning and information updating emerge 
from situations where individuals face incongruent and unfamiliar data, 
especially since most individuals have an aversion towards ambiguity. The 
subject and its economic consequences have been studied ever since the times of 
John Maynard Keynes, and have been linked to several market phenomena, 
such as investor disagreement, excessive optimism and the long-term 
overpricing of small-cap stocks. (De Bondt, Mayoral and Vallelado 2013: 108.) 
 
Even sources of information can be biased, due to for example public 
excitement or conflicts of interest. Individual investors are prone to several 
systematic errors when it comes to updating new information. Inadequate 
updating of new information and failing to adjust for biased signal provision 
create mistakes in trading which cumulate to mispricing. A few major biases 
have been identified and scientifically proven. (Hirshleifer 2014: 20.) 
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3.2.1. Extrapolation bias 
 
Extrapolation bias is also known as trend following and it stems from 
overweighting recent events relative to more distant events. It is closely linked 
to both representativeness and conservatism explained in the behavioral 
finance section of this thesis. In regards to financial markets, extrapolation bias 
causes people to derive conclusions from past price performance in a way that 
shows insufficient regression to the mean. (Shefrin 2005: 50-54.) 
 
De Bondt (1993) examines how people form forecasts of future stock prices 
based on 48-month period stock price charts. He creates an incentivized study 
with students familiar with the efficient market hypothesis. The results indicate 
two important findings. Firstly, most subjects derive forecasts from trends or 
series that they perceive in the stock price data. Secondly, although most of the 
subjects prove to be betting on trends in varying levels, a notable proportion of 
participants predict price reversals. De Bondt labels these subjects 
“contrarians”. This finding proves that people indeed do have heterogeneous 
predictions. 
 
3.2.2. Selection bias 
 
Investors’ systematic tendency to create insufficiently diversified portfolios is 
well documented in financial literature. Blume, Crockett and Friend (1974) 
study a sample of over 17,000 investors to discover that merely 10.7 percent 
managed to create a portfolio featuring over 10 shares, whilst a staggering 50 
percent held no more than two stocks. The empirical findings go against the 
proposed rate in several studies, in which over 30 stocks are required for a well-
diversified portfolio (Statman 1987). 
 
The main phenomenon concerning the selection of assets is known as familiarity 
bias, which describes the tendency of investors to discriminate against 
unfamiliar companies and markets. Individuals are prone to favor familiar 
assets because they appear to be easier to value correctly. For example, a study 
by Benarzi and Thaler (1997) shows that people invest an excessive amount of 
their retirement savings into the shares of the companies where they work. The 
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so-called habit of placing all of one’s eggs in one basket is a severe case of 
failure of diversification, the basis of portfolio theory. 
 
Home bias is a similar case, in which case investors fail to divaricate 
geographically (De Bondt et al. 2013). According to Grinblatt, Keloharju and 
Linnainmaa (2011), people with less financial literacy and low cognitive abilities 
are especially prone to exhibit this bias. On the other hand, the tendency to 
favor domestic assets might also be completely rational and arise from practical 
issues, such as legal restrictions and transactions costs, associated with trading 
foreign assets. 
 
The selection bias is closely linked to belief perseverance, which describes the 
tendency to hold on to one’s opinion too strongly and for too long. Thaler (2005: 
15) discovered that people disregard any information that disclaims their prior 
beliefs and try to avoid cognitive dissonance by not seeking contradictory 
evidence. When the contradictory evidence is overwhelming, most people 
slowly adapt to it while some prefer to disregard it completely. 
 
3.2.3. Encoding bias  
 
The bias connected to encoding of information is also known as the information 
quality and ambiguity bias. Both of these qualities are linked to situations that 
involve uncertain outcomes. Arnold, Fishe and North (2010) study different 
reactions to soft (non-numerical) and hard (numerical) data in the context of 
initial public offerings of equity. They find out that ambiguous prospectuses 
cause further underpricing, which stems from doubt and divergence of opinion 
due to the information being more difficult to interpret. In some cases the 
underpricing effect may take several years to dissolve. 
 
Unpredictability is a ubiquitous feature of financial markets, making ambiguity 
a key factor in all financial decision making. For example, various levels of 
ambiguity are always present in situations where the lack of information 
hinders the assessment of probabilities related to different future outcomes. The 
ever-increasing availability of information can also create ambiguity, especially 
if the information quality varies a lot. This is because people have limited 
information processing capacities and sometimes lack the ability to assess the 
validity and weight of each piece of information. (Shefrin 2002: 372-373.) 
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People have different intrinsic levels of ambiguity tolerance, but most exhibit 
aversion towards it. Ambiguity intolerance is strongly related to each 
individual’s cognitive profile and often results in various decision-making 
paradoxes. Changes in confidence under ambiguity are found to be non-
equivalent to changes in estimated risk in Bayesian learning. Ambiguity-
intolerant investors react excessively to bad news, inducing skewness in returns 
(Epstein and Schneider 2008: 38). 
 
In the context of Bayesian learning, it has been found in numerous studies that 
the quality of information is to be measured by its relative precision. Kim and 
Verrechia (1991) find significant differences in market reactions to 
announcements of known precision with the response to announcements of 
either unanticipated or ambiguous quality. This notion suggests that individual 
agents’ market reactions are to a large extent driven by their prior beliefs and 
the way they utilize new information to update them. 	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4. BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
After years of financial research, it has become disconcertingly clear that the 
predictions of the simple traditional framework are not confirmed in the 
empirical data. In response to this, behavioral finance emerged as a new 
approach to financial markets. Since empirical irregularities are difficult to 
explain with the fully rational Bayesian learning model, a number of alternate 
models are represented in literature. The main argument of the advocates of 
behavioral finance is that traditional models should be altered to better reflect 
actual financial phenomena by using agents that are not fully rational. Their 
paradigm is based on two building blocks: (1) human cognitive and emotional 
psychology, which causes deviations from full rationality and (2) limits to 
arbitrage, which argues that dislocations caused by imperfectly rational traders 
are difficult to undo even for rational traders. (Barberis, Thaler 2003: 1052.) 
 
Individual rationality consists of two assumptions. Using models in which 
some agents are not completely rational means testing hypotheses with agents 
that fail to update their beliefs correctly (in violation of the Bayes law) or make 
choices that are incompatible with the expected utility theorem, or both 
(Barberis & Thaler 2003: 1053). Since people have limited attention and 
information processing abilities, many relevant signals and features of the 
decision environment go unnoticed. This leads to several documented effects on 
market efficiency. (Hirshleifer 2014: 19.) This section will focus on two major 
behavioral finance phenomena related to suboptimal learning on the financial 
markets, representativeness and conservatism. 
 
 
4.1. Overreaction and underreaction 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) were the first to discover stock price 
deviations from fundamental value due to investors extrapolating past 
performance. They found that investors tend to become excessively optimistic 
about past winners and in turn excessively pessimistic about past losers, 
resulting in misvaluation of stocks. Non-Bayesian learning has distinctive 
effects on asset prices. For example, excessive reliance on recent signals causes 
traders to ignore prior value-relevant evidence, which leads to overreaction to 
news. This overreaction is directly transferred into asset prices, causing short-
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term overvaluation and subsequently long-run correction (Odean 1998: 1914). 
This chain of events also implies negative return autocorrelations. (Hirshleifer 
2014: 12).  
 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) propose that investors form 
expectations about stocks by naively extrapolating past performance. This 
means that they measure past performance with growth in sales and earnings 
and estimate future performance with stock-related ratios like price-to-earnings 
and book-to-market. This leads to stocks with strong past performance and 
estimated future performance become overvalued, and stocks that have shown 
worse performance in the past become undervalued. Shefrin and Statman 
(1998) test the hypothesis of naïve extrapolation, and find that investors tend to 
associate higher expected returns with better past performance measured by 
strong sales and earnings growth. 
 
Fama (1998a, 1999b) questions the validity of these behavioral interpretations of 
over- and underreaction. He states that if the overreaction hypothesis is 
formulated to hold regardless of horizon, it is not backed by the data. He also 
argues that due to random variation, over- and underreaction of stock prices 
are approximately equally common and thus cancel each other out, evidently 
not resulting in any systematic deviation from efficient means of expected 
returns. He concludes that this evidence clearly points out that the behavioral 
hypotheses pose no threat to the EMH and rejects the notion of systematic price 
anomalies. Shefrin (2002:  865-89) in turn argues that Fama’s notions might 
hold, if stocks displayed overreaction and underreaction in similar timeframes. 
But as the empirical evidence from numerous studies point out, stocks tend to 
systematically display short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction. 
 
Investors’ limited attention causes both over- and underreactions. Theories 
entail that overlooked good news are followed by positive abnormal returns 
and similarly overlooked bad news are followed by negative abnormal returns. 
The incidents often go hand in hand, in cases such as overreaction to salient 
news and underreaction to less salient news, as well as overreaction to accruals 
and underreaction to earnings components. (Hirshleifer 2014: 14-16.) 
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4.1.1 Conservatism 
 
Conservatism is the main behavioral bias related to non-Bayesian learning. It is 
the tendency to underweight new information relative to prior information, in 
which case base-rates are over-emphasized whilst new evidence is overlooked 
(Shefrin 2002: 19-20). The conservatism bias is also known as anchoring and 
adjustment, the failure to revise opinions when estimating probabilities in the 
face of new evidence. It has also been proven that financial professionals, such 
as analysts, are not immune to the human tendency to hold on to one’s opinion. 
Analysts seem to anchor to their initial estimation and either conservatively 
incorporate new contradictory evidence to it, or fail to adjust efficiently. The 
same process concerns analysts’ reactions to earnings announcements, when 
they also fail to sufficiently revise their initial opinions. (Shefrin 2002: 35-37.) 
 
Basu (1997) uses stock returns to test how news from earnings announcements 
is incorporated in stock prices. He finds that investors react more efficiently to 
bad news. He also finds that conservatism and sensitivity of earnings are 
positively correlated, both increasing over time. 
 
4.1.2. Representativeness 
 
Representativeness bias refers to the manner in which individuals rely heavily 
on stereotypes and past experiences when making judgments about the future 
under uncertainty. In finance, this causes investors to evaluate prospective 
investments based on factors like media coverage, company characteristics and 
recent returns. Representativeness is a behavioral bias of special importance, 
because it has such a significant effect on financial forecasting. (Shefrin 2005: 15-
16.) 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) define representativeness bias as such that when 
facing uncertainty people make judgments on the basis of  (1) the degree to 
which it is similar in essential properties to its parent population and (2) reflects 
the salient features of the process by which it is generated. They created a 
hypothesis that more representative events will be deemed more probable. 
Shefrin (2005: 38) concludes that when individuals rely on representativeness 
when making probability judgments they systematically violate the Bayes law, 
resulting in predictions that are insufficiently regressive to the mean. 
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According to the Bayes’ law, the probability of two separate events D and F can 
be formed as follows: P(F|D) = P(D|F) P(F) / P(D). The insensitivity to prior 
probability of outcomes is also known as base rate neglect. It occurs when 
individuals overweight the conditional probability P (D|F) at the expense of the 
prior probability P(F). In more simple terms, individuals tend to underweight 
initial information in the face of new data (Shefrin 2002: 26-32). Individuals also 
have a habit of relying excessively on the strength of information signals thus 
overlooking their weight, also known as statistical significance. (Hirshleifer 
2001: 14-15.) 
 
According to the Bayes’ law, prior probabilities have an important stance when 
determining an event’s posterior probabilities. The discounting of the priors can 
be seen as evidence of human irrationality, or alternatively a rational reaction to 
perceived differences in the trustworthiness of base rates (Welsh 2007: 704).  
 
 
4.2. Cognitive models 
 
Although investor behavior is defined in literature by rationality, their real-life 
decision-making seldom meets those high standards. Henceforth, what drives 
the financial markets is more often about sentiment and how the numerous 
market participants perceive news, rather than actual economic facts and 
phenomena. (De Bondt et al. 2013: 109.) 
 
Cognitive models were created by researchers to simulate the decision-making 
process more realistically. These models feature specified stages of judgment 
and choice and strive to identify what drives them. They can be described as 
structured representations of behavioral finance studies and findings. (De Bond 
et al. 2013.) 
 
The model of Ozcan and Overby (2008) is divided into two parts, selection and 
encoding of data, and it is used to study the effect of partner diversity on stock 
market reactions to corporate alliance announcements. The selection part 
focuses on the level of similarity between the alliance partners. Extreme levels, 
regardless of direction, cause increased trading and pronounced price 
movements compared to more moderate levels. The encoding part of the model 
is centered on information clarity in terms of information diversity. Average 
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diversity is connected to ambiguity, which can produce either status quo bias or 
negative sentiment, or both. Extreme levels of diversity are regarded as distinct 
signals and linked to investor overconfidence, resulting in a U-shaped 
relationship between diversity and excess returns for firms with less and 
inverted U-shape for firms with more analyst coverage. 
 
 
4.3. Implications on market efficiency 
 
Everyday decisions made by investors are affected by several different factors, 
such as feelings, rationality, social interaction and cognitive limitations. The 
products of these factors are then turned into individual actions, which 
cumulate on the market and are reflected in asset prices. Research on behavioral 
finance has identified many driving factors behind financial decisions and 
biases that ensue from non-rational behavior. The empirical evidence presented 
is robust, but there is still controversy regarding how these individual level 
errors affect market efficiency on an aggregate level. (De Bondt et al. 2013: 99-
100.) 
 
Naturally, the extent on the effect of biases on market efficiency depends on 
which notion of market efficiency is used – are markets regarded as efficient 
when there are no opportunities for riskless arbitrage or does it require prices to 
reflect fundamental values and all available information (Shefrin 2005: 112). 
Even some former advocates of the EMH have now admitted that investors 
often do seem to make large errors that are reflected in prices. Furthermore, the 
vast empirical evidence on persistent price anomalies seem to prove the fact 
that markets are inarguably subject to systematic mispricing. (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Teoh 2002: 140-141.) 
 
4.3.1.  Aggregation of individual biases 
 
There are two conditions that have to apply for the markets to be efficient and 
both of them involve the distribution of individual level errors committed by 
investors. Firstly, errors committed by investors have to be non-systematic and 
result in a zero-value mean error. This implies that the market efficiently 
aggregates the errors. Secondly, the error-wealth covariance is required to be 
zero as well. If initial wealth is not evenly distributed, the magnitude of 
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individual level errors has to compensate for the differences in wealth effect for 
the errors to efficiently cancel each other out. These conditions are hypothetical 
at best, since empirical evidence shows that errors are in fact nonsystematic and 
the error-wealth covariance does not remain zero at all times. In fact, evidence 
shows that since deviations from these conditions are systematic, their 
aggregation on market level reinforces them in a cumulative manner instead of 
efficiently cancelling them. (Shefrin 2005: 115-122.) 
 
Rational investors, also known as “smart money”, are a central part of efficient 
markets, because they are the ones driving prices back to fundamental value by 
profiting on arbitrage opportunities created by irrational traders. One factor 
hindering market efficiency is limits to arbitrage, which combines business risk, 
noise risk and several costs, such as transaction costs as well as both financial 
and cognitive costs related to information (De Bondt et al 2013: 102). Noise risk 
describes a situation where a rational arbitrageur cannot know how long and 
how severely prices will be dislocated from fundamental values. Wealth effect 
is a key part of this scenario, because it gives traders and their opinions about 
prices more weight. (Shleifer 2000: 12.)  
 
Miller (1977) proposed a theory in which pessimistic investors are restricted by 
short sales constraints, which leads to prices reflecting a more optimistic 
valuation at all times. In his model, optimists suffer losses for holding the stock 
because their expectation on the value is inflated. Other price-optimism models 
have been presented later by for example Morris (1996) and Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2001). These models present the idea that a higher spread stems from 
stronger disagreement, and causes the price drift further away from 
fundamental value, eventually leading to lower returns in the future. 
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5. PRICE AND EARNINGS MOMENTUM EFFECT 
 
Momentum anomaly is also known as return continuation or positive short-lag 
autocorrelation, and it describes the tendency of past performance to continue 
in the short run and revert in the long run. Momentum trading strategies 
continue to be profitable today, even though the phenomenon was discovered 
by academics some 50 years ago. These strategies are based on holding a so-
called winner-portfolio consisting of stocks that have performed well during a 
certain time period that lasts less than one year and a loser-portfolio with stocks 
that have performed badly. Jegadeesh (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
show that holding the winner portfolio generates excess returns for the next 
three to twelve months. If the holding period is longer than 12 months, the 
loser-portfolio is able to generate excess returns in turn. The authors conducted 
the study again in 2001 with more recent data and came up with similar results. 
Since its initial discovery, the medium-term momentum pattern has been 
documented across different markets and asset classes. 
 
Price and earnings momentum effect was discovered when researchers 
examined more closely the driving forces behind the excess returns generated 
by certain types of value strategies. The initial belief was that the higher yields 
were due to the strategies bearing more fundamental risk, but it was found that 
they were able to exploit the cumulative effect of non-rational behavior by 
traders.  (Lakoshnishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 1541.) 
 
 
5.1. Rational explanations for the momentum anomaly 
 
The momentum anomaly has yet to be explained with purely rational and risk-
based models. For example, the three-factor model by Fama and French (1996) 
cannot explain it, even though it can be used to explain several other anomalies. 
Rational explanations for the reversal effect are most often related to risk and 
limits to arbitrage.  
 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) attribute profitable momentum strategies to cross-
sectional dispersion in stock returns, which is why they also work in an efficient 
market setting. Explanations involving limits to arbitrage, such as trading costs 
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eliminating abnormal profits, are controversial because there are several studies 
with contradictory findings.  
 
Some studies explain momentum profits with liquidity risk. Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) establish the link between sensitivity to liquidity fluctuations 
and above-average future returns. Additionally Sadka (2006) shows that 
momentum strategy performance is linked to liquidity shocks. Positive liquidity 
shocks induce better performance and vice versa. He attributes part of 
momentum profits to information quality and as compensation to the 
unexpected variations in the ratio of noise traders to informed traders. 
 
 
5.2. Behavioral explanations for the momentum anomaly 
 
The purely rational approach of the basic paradigm of asset pricing is being 
superseded by a more expansive approach based on the psychology of 
investors. Behavioral finance and traditional finance have very different views 
about asset pricing in general and especially the relationship between risk and 
return. In the behavioral approach, expected returns are determined by both 
risk and misvaluation. (Hirshleifer 2001: 2.) 
 
There exists an abundance of behavioral explanations for the excess momentum 
profits. Explanations involving both under and overreaction are the most robust 
ones till date. For example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) demonstrate 
that investors initially underreact to new information, leading to short-term 
return continuation in prices. They subsequently overcorrect the initial 
mispricing, inducing reversals on the long-term. The authors conclude that 
investor sentiment is the main factor behind overreaction to new information.  
 
The study by Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam (1998) implies that investors 
give excessive weight to private information signals, in other words overreact 
to them, and too little weight to public information signals thus underreacting 
to them. The authors demonstrate how short-run positive autocorrelations are 
consistent with long-run negative autocorrelations, because positive return 
autocorrelation stems from continuous overreaction.  
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Jiang and Zhang (2005) include the element of information quality in their 
model and conclude that the momentum effect is most prevalent for firms that 
have notable information uncertainty. Hong, Lim and Stein (1999) propose that 
relevant information is scattered between numerous individuals and cognitive 
limitations prevent investors from interpreting what others know using market 
prices. This causes information to diffuse slowly, resulting in momentum. In 
their study the interaction between two different types of traders is examined. 
The first type, labeled as “news-watchers”, only condition on signals about 
future cash flows. Their information is gradually incorporated into prices 
without causing any deviations from true value. The second type, labeled as 
naïve “momentum traders”, condition solely on a partial price history and 
whose trading causes price trends to initially overshoot and gradually adjust 
with time. The momentum effect is most prevalent for low-attention stocks, 
such as small stocks and stocks with less analyst coverage. (Hong & Stein 1999; 
Hong et al. 2000.) 
 
 
5.3. Heterogeneous beliefs and momentum 
 
Empirical studies provide evidence that there is a causal relationship between 
heterogeneous beliefs or heterogeneous information and phenomena such as 
price drifts and return continuation. The aggregate effect of heterogeneous 
beliefs on market efficiency has been studied and proven by for example by 
Williams (1977) and Goetzmann and Massa (2001). The results have shown that 
greater disagreement among investors is connected to prices being more 
strongly deviated from fundamental value (Verardo 2009: 819). A brief cross-
section review on asset pricing models featuring agents with heterogeneous 
beliefs is provided in this chapter. 
 
Asset pricing models based on rational expectations explain differences of 
opinion with private information. Alternative models, which often relax the 
assumption of full rationality, strive to explain price anomalies with more 
extensive views on the cause and effect of investor disagreement. One 
explanation suggests that the presence of noise dilutes signals of price related 
information and therefore causes a slower drift towards fundamental value. 
Noise can be any news, which are widespread and cause sentiment regardless 
of the fact that the signals are not related to fundamental prices. A more 
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intricate explanation takes into account the fact that in a dynamic rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) model, in addition to their own forecasts, 
investors may need to forecast the forecasts of others. (Banerjee, Kaniel and 
Kremer 2009: 3708-3710.) 
 
Milton Harris and Artur Raviv (1993) model trading in speculative markets 
with agents that have differences of opinion. The authors’ motivation is to 
better understand how financial markets operate by examining the effect on the 
previously documented irregularities concerning the interplay between volume 
and price and their time-series properties. The authors use volume to measure 
market response to public announcements and focus on speculative trading as 
the most important factor behind activity surges. They presume that 
speculation arises from traders’ disagreement concerning new information and 
the overall performance of the asset. They disregard information asymmetries 
as the primary source of disagreement and presume that it stems from 
individual level differences in interpreting data. The agents are thought to have 
identical prior beliefs about the returns of an asset and access to the same 
information, but update their beliefs according to their own model. Thus 
instead of using the rational Bayes model for updating beliefs, each individual 
assesses the relative importance of new information utilizing his or her own 
likelihood function.  
 
The model has two basic functions both related to dispersion of beliefs. Firstly, 
individuals are more sensitive to information when their prior beliefs are 
diffuse. Secondly, speculative trading stems from the dispersion of traders’ 
beliefs. With their model, the authors discover positive correlation between 
absolute price changes and volume. They also find that absolute price changes 
in the mean forecast payoff and volume are positively related and consecutive 
price changes show negative serial correlation. Their consecutive finding is that 
volume is positively autocorrelated and exhibits surges when the market opens 
after a period of being closed. With these results the authors are able to obtain 
underreaction to information that is contradictory to earlier information. It has 
been since established in numerous papers (for example Lee and Swaminathan 
2000) that the momentum effect is more pervasive for stocks with higher 
trading volume.  
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The work of Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) build on the famous metaphor by 
Keynes (1936) in which he compares asset price generation on the financial 
markets to a beauty contest: “We have reached the third degree where we 
devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be”. The metaphor implies that buying a stock is heavily 
motivated by the assumption that other investors find the stock attractive. High 
order beliefs, comprising of a circle of individuals’ beliefs about other 
individuals’ beliefs, are not a feature of classic asset pricing models. The 
purpose of the paper is to examine the role of high-order expectations in an 
asset-pricing context with a REE model of financial markets. The paper also 
builds on the work of Townsend (1983), who argues that agents forming beliefs 
about each other’s beliefs cause serial correlation in unconditional forecast 
errors in a dynamic REE model.  
 
Allen et al. (2006) examine this effect of slow aggregation of beliefs on the law 
of iterated expectations and find that it causes price drifts, such as post-earnings 
announcement drift and momentum. In their model, short-lived traders have 
access to private information, but underweight the information if they believe 
that it will not be reflected in asset prices. Forecasting the next period average 
forecast pushes prices further away from fundamentals, because too much 
weight is given to common public information, which coordinates the average 
expectations. 
 
Banerjee, Kaniel and Kremer (2009) examine further the causal relationship 
between price drifts and the slow aggregation of heterogeneous beliefs and 
present contradictory evidence to that presented by Allen et al. (2006) and 
others. With their model, they find that a disagreement in high order beliefs is a 
necessary pre-condition for heterogeneous beliefs to cause price drifts. The 
authors are able to show theoretically that heterogeneous opinions paired with 
uncertainty about other traders’ opinions create price drift in a dynamic setting. 
The authors argue that rational expectations equilibrium cannot feature price 
drift, because REE models always feature agents with access to information 
about asset prices. They also argue that the common prior assumption as well 
as the assumption that heterogeneous priors are common knowledge should 
both be relaxed. They advocate a difference of opinion (DO) model as a more 
potent substitute for the REE model. With their model, the authors were able to 
obtain momentum caused by agents ignoring the information contained in the 
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equilibrium price, because they were oblivious to the information of other 
agents. 
 
Pástor and Veronesi (2003) adopt a different approach in explaining stock 
valuation related phenomena. In their model, they use the well-known Gordon 
growth formula with the assumption that it only works when the dividend 
growth is constant and known. They argue that stock prices are often inflated 
due to uncertainty regarding the growth factor. The authors use the market-to-
book ratio (M/B) as an example subject to the uncertainty effect. They state that 
uncertainty about a company’s future book value increases the ratio. The model 
also predicts that the M/B declines with time, because gaining more 
information about a company and its prospects reduces the uncertainty factor. 
As proof of this phenomenon they present evidence that the median M/B is 
significantly larger for younger firms than older firms. In a further study, Pástor 
and Veronesi (2006) extend their model to prove that extreme price fluctuations, 
also known as bubbles, are not due to market irrationality as often stated, but 
consistent with a rational general equilibrium model of learning. Interestingly 
the authors are able to confirm these theories using a model that features 
rational agents that update their beliefs according to the Bayes’ law. 
 
Verardo (2009) provides a link between investor disagreement and return 
continuation in a portfolio setting and a predictive regression framework using 
a cross-section of U.S. stock returns.  In her model, heterogeneity of beliefs 
concerning a firm’s fundamentals is measured by the rate of diffusion in 
earnings forecasts provided by financial analysts. The most significant finding 
demonstrates how portfolios with higher rates of heterogeneity generate 
significantly larger momentum returns. Verardo was the first to examine the 
empirical link between investor disagreements and return continuation. Her 
study adds to the body of theoretical models that have been able to establish a 
positive connection between heterogeneity of beliefs and price drift. The results 
are obtained with predictive cross-sectional regressions while controlling for 
commonly known factors behind the momentum effect, such as a stock’s 
visibility, pace of information diffusion, ambiguity regarding fundamentals, 
information precision and volatility. The results can be regarded as robust, 
since the author is able to prove that short-sales constraints do not have an 
effect on them and that they cannot be explained by arbitrage risk. 
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Furthermore, Zhang (2006) examines the effect of information uncertainty on 
short-term stock price continuation. He discovers that greater levels of 
ambiguity in public signals cause increased stock price drift, supporting his 
hypothesis that underreaction to information is more prevalent in the face of 
new data that is difficult to intercept. 
 
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2014) take an alternative approach to explaining 
anomalous price reactions to information. Instead of focusing on investors’ 
differences in updating their beliefs in the face of new information, in other 
words updating their posterior beliefs, they focus on the aggregating effect of 
heterogeneous prior beliefs. They strive to achieve realistic pricing patterns and 
explain underreaction to information with a novel theoretical mechanism that 
features a binary market with traders that have heterogeneous beliefs and are 
subject to wealth effects. In their model, Ottaviani and Sorensen assume that all 
traders have concordant beliefs, which is to say that they interpret information 
rationally and identically. Any discrepancies in the traders’ posterior beliefs are 
thus caused by differences in prior beliefs. The authors state that the reason 
why prices are not self-correlating and act as a posterior belief in the face of 
new information is because instead of acting as a constant “market prior” prices 
reflect the cumulative beliefs of traders and are subject to the marginal trader 
who moves against the information because of the wealth effect. Due to wealth 
constraints, demand for the outcome deemed more probable will decrease and 
demand for the outcome deemed less likely will increase due to changes in 
prices if traders are not willing to adjust their beliefs accordingly. The 
redistribution effect is stronger when traders’ absolute risk aversion decreases 
with wealth. This is how heterogeneity in priors weakens the impact of 
information on the price, causing initial underreaction to news. Wealth effects 
thus assign an increased weight to traders with contrary beliefs to the new 
information, further strengthening the underreaction effect. 
 
The model is able to show both short-term momentum and long-term reversal 
in both static and dynamic settings even in the absence of traders with 
suboptimal learning mechanisms. The traders in the model are all rational 
learners, but subject to different initial beliefs and wealth effects.  The results 
put the role of suboptimal learning in price reactions in a questionable light, 
although the origin of the traders’ heterogeneous prior beliefs seems somewhat 
artificial if they all share a similar information updating process. The model 
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omits several important features of actual financial markets, such as the 
occurrence of speculative retrade, and is also limited to reactions to public 
information and thus not directly applicable to a reality where traders have 
access to private information. 
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, the data and methods of the study are presented in detail. The 
first part of the chapter is focused on describing the data used in this thesis, 
shedding light on the sources of the data, describing the databases and indices 
as well as forming the different sample sub-periods used for testing the data. 
Descriptive statistics are also presented in the first part. The second section is 
dedicated to introducing and describing in detail the various methods used for 
portfolio analyses as well as the regression analysis, which finalizes the 
empirical part of the study. 
 
 
6.1. Data description 
 
The study is conducted using data from S&P 500 “survivor stocks”, in other 
words stocks from the index selection in the year 2000 that continue to be 
featured in 2016. This, combined with other selection criteria, narrows the 
selection down to altogether 200 stocks. The use of survivor stocks ensures that 
all time periods feature the same stocks and are therefore fit for comparison. 
The S&P 500 Index is widely used in financial literature and often regarded as 
the most applicable single gauge of large-gap US equities and a suitable proxy 
for the market. The index represents almost 80% of available market 
capitalization while benchmarking for over 7.8 trillion US dollars. (Standard & 
Poor’s 2017.) 
 
The main variable, dispersion (DISP), is the coefficient of variation of analyst 
forecasts of earnings for the end of the current or the next fiscal year, defined as 
the standard deviation of forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
(Verardo 2009). The dispersion variable represents investors’ heterogeneity of 
beliefs related to company fundamentals. In prior research, forecasts of earnings 
for the end of the current fiscal year are used, but in this study forecasts for the 
next fiscal year are used due to limitations in the data. Monthly logarithmic 
returns are calculated from stock price changes to allow testing for momentum 
profits. Stock-related and firm-level data include standard deviation, market 
value, book-to-market, turnover volume, volatility and beta. Observations with 
a zero mean forecast of earnings are discarded, but observations with negative 
mean forecast of earnings are included. Each firm is also required to have at 
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least two analyst forecasts at each point in time throughout the entire sample 
period.   
 
The sample period consists of monthly data and covers fourteen years from 
2002 to 2015. The period includes one major momentum crash, the subprime 
crisis, which began during the later half of 2007. The sample is split for testing 
in order to capture the effects of the varying market conditions. The sample 
period is broken down into three separate periods according to the state of the 
market at the time. The pre-crisis period spans from January 2002 to July 2007. 
The purpose of the pre-crisis period is to proxy for a “normal”, crisis-free state 
of the financial markets. Subsequently, the crisis period begins around the 
Quant Meltdown in August 2007 and ends with the depression of the stock 
market in March 2009. The post-crisis period is set from April 2009 to the end of 
the year 2015. Years 2000 and 2001 are left out due to the dot.com boom 
induced momentum crash, which would likely have a negative impact on the 
results for the pre-crisis period. The year 2016 is also omitted from the study 
due to data restrictions. 
 
The stock related data is obtained from Datastream. Corresponding information 
on the monthly risk-free rate of interest and excess return on the market is 
obtained from the Kenneth R. French online data library, as well as the monthly 
Fama-French Three Factor Model values. The Rm-Rf factor, also known as the 
market premium, is formed of stocks incorporated in the U.S. and listed on 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ indices. The Fama-French risk factors are 
constructed by using six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and book-to-
market. SMB (Small Minus Big) is formed by subtracting the average return of 
the three big portfolios from the average return of the three small portfolios. 
HML (High Minus Low) is calculated by subtracting the average returns of the 
two growth portfolios from the average returns of the two value portfolios. 
(French 2017.) 
 
The data has been prepared using MS Office Excel. Subsequently Matlab was 
used for conducting the portfolio analysis. Finally the results have been tested 
using Eviews.  
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6.1.1. Descriptive statistics 	  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the data sample in the first sub-period, 
the pre-crisis period, ranging from the beginning of 2002 to July 2007.  The 
mean and median dispersions are the lowest of the sub-samples, at 4.45 and 
1.88 respectively. The average number of analyst coverage ranges from two to 
45 forecasts per month. Mean consensus, the monthly mean forecast of earnings 
per share, at 2.38 here is the lowest of all sub-samples, but still stays relatively 
stable throughout the entire time period. Average return is positive but 
relatively modest at 0.67 percent per month. 
 
	  
Table	   1.	   Descriptive	   statistics	   of	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period.	   DISP	   is	   the	   average	   ratio	   between	   the	  standard	   deviation	   of	   analyst	   forecasts	   of	   earnings	   and	   the	   absolute	   value	   of	   the	   mean	   of	   the	  forecasts	  (coefficient	  of	  variation).	  Consensus	  is	  the	  monthly	  mean	  forecast	  of	  earnings	  per	  share.	  AN	  COV	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  monthly	  forecasts	  per	  share.	  VOL	  is	  average	  volatility	  and	  RET	  is	  the	  average	  monthly	  return.	  
 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the crisis period ranging from 
August 2007 to March 2009. Interestingly, while the mean and median 
dispersion are both higher than during the pre-crisis period, the maximum 
dispersion is notably lower.  This suggests that the dispersion is not driven by 
individual observations but rather increased amount of forecast dispersion in 
the sub-sample as a whole. The spread between maximum and minimum 
consensus is also at its highest, whilst the mean consensus remains relatively 
stable. Analyst coverage is at its lowest, averaging at 15.3 monthly forecasts per 
  DISP Consensus AN_COV VOL RET 
Mean 4.45 2.38 16.92 24.73 0.67 
Median 1.88 1.97 16.00 23.24 0.87 
Maximum 2,600.00 45.02 45.00 63.89 90.34 
Minimum 0.00 -3.8 2.00 10.92 -102.08 
Std. Dev. 29.32 2.94 6.85 7.75 7.91 
Skewness 61.10 9.69 0.59 1.49 -0.99 
Kurtosis 4,890.06 122.92 3.36 6.28 18.67 
Observations 13,333 13,333 13,333 13,333 13,333 
 44 
company. Average volatility remains stable at 24.25, whilst the average monthly 
return takes a dive at -3.17 percent per month. 
 
 
Table	  2.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  the	  crisis	  period.	  DISP	  is	  the	  average	  ratio	  between	  the	  standard	  deviation	   of	   analyst	   forecasts	   of	   earnings	   and	   the	   absolute	   value	   of	   the	   mean	   of	   the	   forecasts	  (coefficient	  of	  variation).	  Consensus	  is	  the	  monthly	  mean	  forecast	  of	  earnings	  per	  share.	  AN	  COV	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  monthly	  forecasts	  per	  share.	  VOL	  is	  average	  volatility	  and	  RET	  is	  the	  average	  monthly	  return.	  
 
 
Finally, table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the post-crisis period of 
altogether 81 months. Dispersion, averaging at 6.48, is at its highest of the entire 
sample period. Average consensus increases slightly, whilst the ratio of analyst 
coverage increases notably from the prior sub-samples, as the average number 
of monthly forecast is 19.79 during the crisis period. Average volatility is at is 
lowest at 22.59. The stocks also managed to generate positive return during the 
post-crisis period, averaging at 1.16 percent per month. 
 	   	  
 DISP Consensus AN_COV VOL RET 
Mean 6.14 3.13 15.30 24.25 -3.17 
Median 2.10 2.84 15.00 23.12 -1.55 
Maximum 933.33 45.31 40.00 47.82 66.43 
Minimum 0.00 -33.57 3.00 10.92 -137.92 
Std. Dev. 25.72 2.78 5.70 6.77 12.71 
Skewness 19.82 2.18 0.59 0.73 -1.78 
Kurtosis 557.38 57.61 3.73 3.34 13.94 
Observations 3,980 3,980 3,980 3,980 3,980 
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Table	   3.	   Descriptive	   statistics	   of	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   period.	   DISP	   is	   the	   average	   ratio	   between	   the	  standard	   deviation	   of	   analyst	   forecasts	   of	   earnings	   and	   the	   absolute	   value	   of	   the	   mean	   of	   the	  forecasts	  (coefficient	  of	  variation).	  Consensus	  is	  the	  monthly	  mean	  forecast	  of	  earnings	  per	  share.	  AN	  COV	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  monthly	  forecasts	  per	  share.	  VOL	  is	  average	  volatility	  and	  RET	  is	  the	  average	  monthly	  return.	  
 DISP Consensus AN_COV VOL RET 
Mean 6.48 3.51 19.79 22.59 1.16 
Median 1.90 3.01 19.00 21.83 1.31 
Maximum 4,500.00 40.76 51.00 47.82 82.14 
Minimum 0.00 -9.53 2.00 10.41 -46.04 
Std. Dev. 52.71 2.85 7.25 6.72 7.27 
Skewness 51.57 3.73 0.44 0.62 0.38 
Kurtosis 3,701.78 34.10 3.49 3.16 8.28 
Observations 16,119 16,119 16,119 16,119 16,119 
 
 
6.2. Approach and model 
 
The purpose of the study is to provide an empirical link between momentum 
profits and heterogeneous beliefs using the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as 
the main variable to measure the relation between the diffusion of forecasts per 
given stock and return continuation in a portfolio setting and in a time-series 
regression framework. The basic methodology is adopted from Verardo (2009) 
and adapted to suit the purpose of the study. 
 
The total length of the data period is 168 months, split into sub-periods of 66, 21 
and 81 months, respectively. The first step is portfolio formation by 
implementing so-called double sorts, where each month the stocks are initially 
divided into three momentum portfolios by sorting on terciles based on past 
cumulative returns. Subsequently, each of the momentum portfolios are further 
sorted independently by their dispersion into three equally weighted sub-
portfolios, yielding a total of nine sub-portfolios. The decision of not dividing 
the samples into more portfolios for finer breakdown is justified by the risk of 
individual portfolios becoming too small, as there are only 200 stocks in the 
entire sample. A small number of stocks in a portfolio would likely result in the 
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portfolios becoming too undiversified and subsequently yielding larger 
standard errors in the test statistic (Dische 2002). 
 
6.2.1. Portfolio formation 
 
Portfolios are formed by sorting stocks on the basis of past returns and 
dispersion of analyst forecasts to test the hypothesis that heterogeneity of 
beliefs is related to momentum. In the first iteration, momentum portfolios are 
formed using the 12-7-1-momemtum strategy introduced by Novy-Marx (2012), 
as his research findings show that momentum strategies based on intermediate 
past returns generate superior return compared to strategies based on 
immediate past returns. Zero-investment strategy returns are regarded as 
momentum profits. Rolling past raw returns are calculated for each of the 200 
stocks, by using a ranking period from 12 to seven months prior and skipping 
the most recent month’s return. Skipping the return from the most recent 
month has been a standard in momentum research since Asness (1994) to avoid 
the one-month reversal in stock returns due to liquidity and microstructure 
biases (Asness, Ilmanen, Israel & Moskowitz, 2015). As the purpose of the 
strategy is to rebalance at the end of each month, the stocks are placed into 
three separate momentum portfolios by sorting on terciles based on the 
cumulative intermediate past returns. The three monthly momentum portfolios 
are the loser portfolio comprising stocks with the lowest cumulative return, the 
medium portfolio and the winner portfolio comprising of stocks with the 
highest cumulative return for the rolling past 12 to seven-month ranking 
period. 
 
In the second iteration, the stocks are further sorted to terciles based on average 
analyst forecast dispersion for the corresponding time period as in the first sort. 
This yields altogether nine portfolios, as the initial three momentum portfolios 
are further divided into thee sub-portfolios according to the amount of forecast 
dispersion. 
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Table	  4.	  Portfolio	  formation	  
	  
Low	  dispersion	   Medium	  dispersion	   High	  dispersion	  
Loser	   Portfolio	  1	   Portfolio	  2	   Portfolio	  3	  
Medium	   Portfolio	  4	   Portfolio	  5	   Portfolio	  6	  
Winner	   Portfolio	  7	   Portfolio	  8	   Portfolio	  9	  
 
 
6.3. Time-series tests for momentum-dispersion portfolios 
 
The final method for testing the hypotheses features multivariate regressions. 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model is used to assess whether covariance 
with possible risk factors contains explanatory power over the obtained 
momentum returns. The excess returns independently for all of the nine 
portfolios as well as the spread between momentum returns for high and low 
dispersion portfolios act as dependent variables in the time-series regression, 
while the FF3 factors act as the independent, explanatory variables. Therefore 
altogether 30 time-series regressions will be performed. All of the regressions 
run in this thesis are Newey-West (1987) corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  
 
 
 (2) (𝑹𝑾 − 𝑹𝑳)𝐇𝐈𝐆𝐇  –   (𝑹𝑾 − 𝑹𝑳)𝒕𝑯𝑰𝑮𝑯 − (𝑹𝑾 − 𝑹𝑳)𝒕𝑳𝑶𝑾 =   𝛂𝒑 + 𝒃𝒑   𝑹𝑴𝒕 −𝒓𝒇𝒕 +   𝒔𝒑𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝒉𝒑𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 +   𝛆	  
 
 
where  (Rw – RL)tHIGH – (Rw – RL)tLOW = excess return for each portfolio 
or the difference in excess momentum returns between high- and 
low-dispersion portfolios (“spread”). 
 
RMt – rft = the equity market risk premium. It is calculated by 
subtracting the risk free interest rate from the aggregate equity 
return and represents the return from being long in equities at 
market capitalization weights. Basically it is the “spread” of return 
between all equities and all cash. 
 
 48 
SMB = “small minus big” captures the size effect by representing 
the “spread” return of being long in small stocks and long in big 
stocks. 
 
HML = “high minus low” represents value investing as a portfolio 
that is long in stocks with high book-to-market ratio and short in 
stocks with high book-to-market ratio. 
 
ε = Error term  
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7. RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the empirical findings and results obtained by using the 
data and statistical models that were presented in the previous chapter. The 
results from the portfolio analysis regarding plain momentum returns will be 
presented first, followed by the results from the momentum-dispersion 
portfolios. Finally the results from the time-series regressions will be presented. 
 
 
7.1. Momentum returns 
 
As the first step, portfolio analysis is performed in Matlab to determine the 
effectiveness of the momentum trading strategy during each time period. The 
Novy-Marx 12-7-1 momentum strategy is applied (Novy-Marx 2012), in which 
the three portfolios are formed by looking at an intermediate horizon for 
ranking past performance measured over the period from 12 to seven months 
prior and held for one month. With his findings, Novy-Marx (2012) challenges 
the traditional view of short-run autocorrelation as the primary source of the 
momentum phenomenon. However, he is still unable to demonstrate exactly 
what causes the link between recent and intermediate returns.  The data is also 
tested with the widely used 6-1-1 momentum trading strategy, which combines 
the one-month holding period with a six-month ranking period. This is the 
strategy that is traditionally used in momentum studies and as the ranking 
period is based on more recent returns, it relies heavily on the tendency of 
prices to stay in motion. Similarly to the findings of Novy-Marx (2012), the 
obtained results are similar with both strategies, but stronger with the 12-7-1 
strategy. Therefore only the results obtained with the 12-7-1 strategy are 
presented here. 
 
The major downside to momentum strategy is the in-built risk of a momentum 
crash. These are the rare and persistent series of negative returns that occur 
when markets are in a state of crisis and mainly during the rebound phase after 
adverse market conditions, when prices of the so-called loser stocks bounce 
back faster than winner stocks, thus reversing the basic return pattern of the 
momentum strategy (Daniel and Moskowitz 2016). There have been two major 
momentum crashes since the beginning of the new millennium, first after the 
collapse of the tech bubble in the early 2000’s and secondly after the financial 
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crisis of the late 2000’s. Therefore, the realistic assumption in the onset of this 
study was that the results obtained with this data period would not fully reflect 
Verardo’s (2009) findings, as the time period used in her study that spun from 
1984 to 2000 was relatively crisis-free. 
 
7.1.1. Momentum return in the pre-crisis period 
 
The purpose of the pre-crisis sub period is to serve as an example of how 
efficient the momentum strategy is during a “normal”, crisis-free state of the 
market. This is an important backdrop in understanding how the efficacy 
changes as the state of the market changes. Average monthly returns are 
reported for the winner portfolio, intermediate and loser portfolios. The 
average monthly momentum return is reported as the spread between the 
winner and loser portfolios. Table 4 confirms the presence of some significant 
portfolio returns in the first sub-sample, but the momentum spread is relatively 
low and insignificant. This may result from the sample being biased towards 
large firms. 
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Table	  5.	  Momentum	  returns	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  return	  during	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period.	  Stocks	  are	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  returns:	  R1	  contains	  past	  losers	  and	  R3	  past	   winners.	   R2	   is	   the	   portfolio	   for	   the	   stocks	   with	   intermediary	   past	   performance.	   R3-­‐R1	  comprises	  profits	  from	  the	  momentum	  strategy	  of	  buying	  the	  winner	  portfolio	  and	  selling	  the	  loser	  portfolio.	  
Momentum portfolio Return p-value 
      
R1 1.07 ** 0.02 
  (2.51)   
R2 1.13 *** 0.00 
  (-3.407)   
R3 1.32 *** 0.00 
  (3.10)   
R3 – R1 0.25 0.46 
  (0.74)   
   
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
	  
Furthermore, as the collapse of the tech bubble and the momentum crash that 
followed are so close to the beginning of the pre-crisis period, some of the 
aftermath can be seen to have an effect on the momentum returns presented in 
Table 4. All three portfolios produced positive returns significant at a 5% or 1% 
level, but the momentum spread, at only 25 basis points per month, is relatively 
low and insignificant. This is most likely due to the fact that while the winner 
portfolio (R3) did produce positive return (at 1.32 percent per month on 
average), the difference between the winner and loser portfolio is not 
substantial enough to enable significant returns with the momentum strategy. 
The markets have probably still been recovering from the recent momentum 
crisis during the earlier years of the pre-crisis period, resulting in the relatively 
faster rebound of the loser stocks, as presented by Daniel and Moskowitz 
(2016). 
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The first hypothesis, stating that the momentum strategy is able to generate 
positive absolute return in all states of the market, can already be rejected at this 
stage. The returns generated by the strategy of buying winners and selling 
losers does generate a positive return during the pre-crisis period, but the effect 
is statistically insignificant. 
 
7.1.2. Momentum return in the crisis and post-crisis periods 
 
When comparing momentum returns from time periods with completely 
opposing market states, it is important to bear in mind that stocks are divided 
into momentum portfolios according to their performance relative to their 
peers. This method differs notably from the somewhat similar investment 
strategy of trend following, since where trend following takes the prevailing 
market trend into account and focuses on upswings and downswings, 
momentum investing consists of simply ranking the performance of stocks 
during a certain time period regardless of the market trend (Asness et al. 2014). 
 
 The effect of the market trend is well illustrated in the momentum portfolio 
returns presented in Table 6. During the crisis period, a typical “winner stock” 
was down only a few percent, therefore performing well relative to the other 
stocks that were substantially more down on average. Consequently, the 
momentum spread (R3-R1) for the crisis period is positive (at 0.33 percent) even 
though the momentum returns were negative for both the winner (R3) and loser 
(R1) portfolios, at -3.19 and -3.52 percent respectively. The momentum returns 
were quite insignificant during the crisis period, as the returns produced by the 
intermediate (R2) and winner portfolios were only significant at a ten percent 
level and the loser portfolio return and spread were not statistically significant 
at all.  
 
I find that momentum returns are not significant for all of the sample sub-
periods mostly due to the period during and after the market crash 
experiencing unexpectedly low momentum returns. The momentum anomaly’s 
prevalence and robustness are found to be exceptionally stable and there are 
suggestions of momentum premium being part of the markets since their very 
beginning, well before becoming the subject of academic interest. However, 
despite the impressively stable long-term performance, the momentum 
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anomaly is also characterized by occasional longer periods of poor performance 
as well as occasional short spells of extreme performance.  (Asness et al. 2014.) 
 
 
Table	   6.	  Momentum	   returns	   sorted	   into	   three	   portfolios	   based	   on	   past	   return	   during	   the	   crisis	  period.	  Stocks	  are	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  returns:	  R1	  contains	  past	  losers	  and	  R3	  past	   winners.	   R2	   is	   the	   portfolio	   for	   the	   stocks	   with	   intermediary	   past	   performance.	   R3-­‐R1	  comprises	  profits	  from	  the	  momentum	  strategy	  of	  buying	  the	  winner	  portfolio	  and	  selling	  the	  loser	  portfolio.	  
Momentum portfolio Return p-value 
      
R1 -3.52 0.11 
  (-1.68)   
R2 -2.90 * 0.08 
  (-1.83)   
R3 -3.19 * 0.06 
  (-1.99)   
R3 – R1 0.33 0.79 
  (0.27)  
   
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
The theory by Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) of loser stocks experiencing faster 
rebound than winner stocks after a momentum crash is again verified by the 
momentum portfolio return data from the post-crisis period. The loser portfolio  
(R1) produced 1.52 percent of monthly momentum return on average at a five 
percent significance level, while the winner portfolio (R3) produced merely 0.85 
percent at a ten percent significance level, being surpassed also by the 
intermediate portfolio (R2) with 1.11 percent of average monthly momentum 
returns at a five percent significance level. Consequently, the momentum 
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spread (R3-R1) for this time period is negative at -0.67 percent and statistically 
insignificant. 
 
 
Table	  7.	  Momentum	  returns	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  return	  during	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period.	  Stocks	  are	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  returns:	  R1	  contains	  past	  losers	  and	  R3	  past	  winners.	  R2	  is	  the	  portfolio	  for	  the	  stocks	  with	  intermediary	  past	  performance.	  R3-­‐R1	  comprises	  profits	  from	  the	  momentum	  strategy	  of	  buying	  the	  winner	  portfolio	  and	  selling	  the	  loser	  portfolio.	  
Momentum portfolio Return p-value 
      
R1 1.52 ** 0.02 
  (2.43)   
R2 1.11 ** 0.02 
  (-3.49)   
R3 0.85 * 0.06 
  (3.89)   
R3 – R1 -0.67 0.17 
  (-1.40)   
   
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
The spring of 2009 marked the beginning one of the largest sustained 
drawdown periods for momentum investing (Daniel & Moskowitz 2016). As 
the spell lasted until March 2013, its effects are clearly visible in the results, 
especially in the relatively low return for the winner portfolio and consequently 
the negative and statistically insignificant momentum spread.  
 
The rejection of the first hypothesis, stating that the momentum strategy is able 
to generate positive absolute return in all states of the market, is further backed 
by the evidence provided by the data from the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
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The spreads yielded by the strategy are not consistently positive across the 
market periods as well as statistically insignificant throughout the entire 
sample. 
 
 
7.2. Momentum-dispersion returns 
 
The results from portfolio strategies based on past returns and disagreement are 
presented in this section.  Disagreement, or differences in investors’ beliefs, is 
measured by dispersion in analyst forecasts of earnings. The initial hypothesis 
is that differences in beliefs exacerbate return continuation.  I find that the 
efficacy of the strategy as well as the relation between past returns and 
disagreement show notable variation depending on the state of the market 
during the examination period. A positive relationship between momentum 
and forecast dispersion is found in the pre-crisis period data, absolutely no 
discernible relationship during the financial crisis period and finally a reversed 
outcome, where there is a negative relationship between momentum and 
forecast dispersion, in the post-crisis period data. The difference between the 
high-dispersion momentum spread and low-dispersion momentum spread, 
while positive during some sub-periods, fails to be significant. Therefore the 
relation between return continuation and disagreement during this sample 
period seems to be less robust and significant than what Verardo’s (2009) 
findings suggest. 
 
7.2.1. Momentum-dispersion return in the pre-crisis period 
 
Almost all of the portfolios yield positive return during the pre-crisis period. 
The significance levels of the returns vary considerably, ranging from ten down 
to one percent. The winner portfolios generate more return than the loser 
portfolios on all levels of dispersion, resulting in positive momentum spreads. 
Whilst the low-dispersion momentum portfolios all generated positive returns 
significant at five or ten-percent level, the monthly momentum spread at 0.48 
percent on average is statistically insignificant. The average monthly return 
yielded by the winner portfolio (R3) with intermediate dispersion (DISP2) is 
1.73 percent and highly statistically significant at a one-percent level. The 
momentum spread (R3-R1) at the intermediate dispersion level is 0.99 percent 
and also significant. The high-dispersion (DISP3) winner portfolio generated an 
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average monthly return of 1.97 percent, highly significant at a one-percent level. 
The monthly average high dispersion momentum spread is 1.23 percent at a 
five-percent significance level. The difference in momentum returns between 
the high and the low dispersion portfolios is 75 bps per month, but statistically 
insignificant. Therefore the third hypothesis is not accepted. 
 
 
Table	  8.	  Pre-­‐crisis	  momentum	  portfolios	  formed	  on	  past	  profits	  and	  forecast	  dispersion.	  Stocks	  are	  initially	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  returns.	  R1	  contains	  past	  losers	  and	  R3	  past	  winners.	  R2	  is	  the	  portfolio	  for	  the	  stocks	  with	  intermediary	  past	  performance.	  R3-­‐R1	  comprises	  profits	  from	  the	  momentum	  strategy	  of	  buying	  the	  winner	  portfolio	  and	  selling	  the	  loser	  portfolio.	  	  The	  momentum	  portfolios	  are	  further	  independently	  sorted	  into	  portfolios	  based	  on	  the	  dispersion	  of	  analyst	  forecasts	  at	  the	  time	  of	  portfolio	  formation.	  
Momentum 
portfolio DISP1 DISP2 DISP3  DISP3-DISP1 
            
R1 0.72 * 0.74 ** 0.75 *     
 (1.90) (-2.52) (1.89)     
R2 1.24 ** 1.05 *** 1.08 **     
 (2.62) (2.81) (2.60)     
R3 1.19 ** 1.73 *** 1.97 ***     
 (2.13) (3.89) (3.47)     
R3 – R1 0.48 0.99 *** 1.23 **   0.75 
  (1.23) (2.98) (2.54)   (1.44) 
      
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 	  
7.2.2. Momentum-dispersion return in the crisis period 
	  
The momentum strategy yielded negative returns during the economically 
turbulent crisis period. The portfolios consisting of recent winner stocks were 
hit the hardest, generating large monthly negative returns on average, ranging 
from -3.7 percent in the high-dispersion portfolio to -4.2 percent in the low-
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dispersion portfolio. The difference in momentum returns between the high 
and the low dispersion portfolios is 55 bps per month, but statistically 
insignificant. Hypothesis number four is thus rejected. 
 	  
Table	  9.	  Crisis	  period	  momentum	  portfolios	  formed	  on	  past	  profits	  and	  forecast	  dispersion.	  Stocks	  are	  initially	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  returns.	  R1	  contains	  past	  losers	  and	  R3	  past	  winners.	  R2	   is	   the	  portfolio	   for	   the	   stocks	  with	   intermediary	  past	  performance.	  R3-­‐R1	  comprises	  profits	  from	  the	  momentum	  strategy	  of	  buying	  the	  winner	  portfolio	  and	  selling	  the	  loser	  portfolio.	  	  The	  momentum	  portfolios	  are	  further	  independently	  sorted	  into	  portfolios	  based	  on	  the	  dispersion	  of	  analyst	  forecasts	  at	  the	  time	  of	  portfolio	  formation.	  
Momentum 
portfolio DISP1 DISP2 DISP3  DISP3-DISP1 
            
R1 -2.46 -1.95 -2.51 *     
  (-1.24) (-1.57) (-1.96)     
R2 -3.40 -3.03 -3.20 *     
  (-0.56) (-1.70) (-1.95)     
R3 -4.20 * -3.96 ** -3.70     
  (1.81) (-2.24) (-1.62)     
R3 – R1 -1.74 -2.02 *** -1.19   0.55 
  (-1.46) (-2.53) (-0.79)   (0.30) 
      
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 	  
7.2.3. Momentum-dispersion return in the post-crisis period 
 
The loser portfolios (R1) generated both greater and more significant returns 
relative to the other momentum portfolios during the post-crisis period. The 
low-dispersion (DISP1) loser portfolio generated a monthly return of 1.60 
percent on average, whilst the medium (DISP2) and high-dispersion (DISP3) 
loser portfolios generated 1.084 and 1.01 percent, respectively. All returns are 
highly significant at a one-percent level. This is most likely due to the earlier 
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mentioned effect of a relatively faster and more robust rebound of loser stocks 
after a momentum crash (Asness & Moskowitz 2016). The medium momentum 
portfolios (R2) also generated positive return during the post-crisis period. The 
low-dispersion portfolio generated a monthly return of 1.37 percent on average, 
whilst the medium and high-dispersion portfolios generated 1.13 and 0.94 
percent, respectively. All returns are significant at a five-percent level. The 
winner portfolios (R3) managed to also generate positive return, but at a lower 
and less significant level than the other momentum portfolios. The low-
dispersion portfolio generated an average monthly return of 1.38 percent, 
statistically significant at a ten-percent level. Equally significant, the medium 
portfolio generated 1.09 percent return on average. The high-dispersion winner 
portfolio managed to generate a mere 0.85 percent average monthly return that 
displayed no statistical significance. Due to the loser portfolios faring notably 
better than the winner portfolios during this time period, the momentum 
spreads were either negative or close to zero and statistically insignificant. The 
difference in momentum returns between the high and the low dispersion 
portfolios is 6 bps per month and statistically insignificant.  
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Table	  10.	  Post-­‐crisis	  momentum	  portfolios	  formed	  on	  past	  profits	  and	  forecast	  dispersion.	  Stocks	  are	  initially	  sorted	  into	  three	  portfolios	  based	  on	  past	  returns.	  R1	  contains	  past	  losers	  and	  R3	  past	  winners.	  R2	   is	   the	  portfolio	   for	   the	   stocks	  with	   intermediary	  past	  performance.	  R3-­‐R1	  comprises	  profits	  from	  the	  momentum	  strategy	  of	  buying	  the	  winner	  portfolio	  and	  selling	  the	  loser	  portfolio.	  	  The	  momentum	  portfolios	  are	  further	  independently	  sorted	  into	  portfolios	  based	  on	  the	  dispersion	  of	  analyst	  forecasts	  at	  the	  time	  of	  portfolio	  formation.	  
Momentum 
portfolio DISP1 DISP2 DISP3  DISP3-DISP1 
       
R1 1.60 *** 1.08 *** 1.01 ***   
  (3.36) (3.12) (2.77)   
R2 1.37 ** 1.13 ** 0.94 **   
  (2.23) (2.44) (2.13)   
R3 1.38 * 1.09 * 0.85   
  (1.75) (1.74) (1.33)   
R3 – R1 -0.22 0.01 -0.16  0.06 
  (-0.50) (0.02) (-0.36)  (0.13) 
      
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
7.3. Results for the time-series tests 
 
This section presents the results from the time-series tests that were conducted 
in order to make sure that the results from the portfolio analysis are not driven 
by possible covariance with risk factors. Fama-French three-factor model is 
estimated for the momentum portfolio returns as well as the difference between 
high- and low-dispersion portfolio returns, net of the risk-free rate. Equation 2, 
presented earlier in the methodology section, describes the applied regression 
model in detail.  
 
Performing a similar regression analysis, Verardo (2009) finds that winner and 
loser portfolios have roughly the same beta, whilst loser portfolios have higher 
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loadings on the risk factors. I find that the winner portfolio has a higher beta 
than the loser portfolio in each dispersion category throughout the entire 
sample. The findings are described in more detailed below. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the results from the pre-crisis period are reported 
in Table 11. Notable findings from the sub-sample include that for the medium- 
and high-dispersion portfolios (DISP2 and DISP3), momentum returns for the 
winner portfolio (R3) stay positive and statistically significant after controlling 
for the effects of market risk, size and book-to-market characteristics. The 
spread between the winner and loser portfolio  (R3-R1) remains statistically 
significant only for the high-dispersion portfolio. The loser portfolios seem to 
have slightly lower betas than the winner portfolios across all dispersion 
categories. The winner portfolios typically have higher (less negative) loadings 
on the SMB and HML factors. Overall, the adjusted R2 levels are solid for time-
series regressions on the portfolios, but drop to low levels when concerning 
regression analysis on the spreads between winner and loser portfolios. The 
reported R2 levels are in line with the results from previous studies. In 
conclusion, the momentum return for high-dispersion stocks remains positive 
and statistically significant after controlling for market risk, size and value 
characteristics. 
 
Table 12 presents the time-series regression results from the crisis period. The 
portfolio returns during the period are much lower to begin with, so it is no 
surprise that the estimates of the intercept reported in the time-series regression 
table are both low and statistically insignificant. Winner portfolios have higher 
betas than loser portfolios across all dispersion categories. Winner portfolios 
typically have lower loadings on the SMB factor and higher loadings on the 
HML factor, which is in line with Verardo’s (2009) findings. The adjusted R2 
levels are also similar. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the results from the post-crisis period are 
reported in Table 13. The most evident observation is that in this sample, all 
spreads between the winner and loser portfolios are negative and one to ten 
percent statistically significant. The winner portfolios have higher betas as 
opposed to Verardo’s study where winner and loser portfolios had similar 
betas. Winner portfolios also seem to have higher loadings on the SMB and 
HML factors, indicating that winner portfolio returns have higher covariance 
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with all of the risk factors featured in the model. The adjusted R2 levels are 
slightly lower than those reported by Verardo (2009). 
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Table	   11.	   Pre-­‐crisis	   time-­‐series	   regressions	   including	   Fama-­‐French	   (1993)	   three-­‐factor	   model	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  monthly	  excess	  returns	  for	  the	  momentum-­‐dispersion	  portfolios.	  R1	  is	  the	  loser	   portfolio,	   R2	   the	  medium	   portfolio	   and	   R3	   the	  winner	   portfolio.	   DISP1	   is	   the	   portfolio	   for	  stocks	  with	  low	  dispersion,	  DISP2	  for	  medium	  dispersion	  and	  DISP3	  for	  high	  dispersion	  of	  analyst	  forecasts.	  The	  parameters	  are	  estimated	  as	  follows:	  (Rpt	  −	  rft	  )	  =	  ap	  +	  bp	  (Rmt	  −	  rft	  )	  +	  sp	  SMBt	  +	  hp	  HMLt	  +	   ept	   .	   The	   intercept	   estimates	   are	  denoted	  as	  percentage	  points.	  T-­‐statistics	   are	   shown	   in	  parentheses.	   All	   regressions	   are	   Newey-­‐West	   (1987)	   corrected	   for	   heteroskedasticity	   and	  autocorrelation.	  
Dispersion Momentum Portfolio a b s h   Adj. R
2
 
                
DISP1 R1 -0.05 0.99 -0.30 -0.13   0.65 
    (-0.18) (9.08) (-3.62) (-0.87)     
  R3 -0.04 1.45 -0.12 -0.20   0.75 
    (-0.12) (11.82) (-0.61) (-0.88)     
  R3-R1 0.00 0.46 0.17 -0.07   0.21 
    (0.01) (2.52) (0.75) (-0.28)     
DISP2 R1 0.18 0.79 -0.24 -0.21   0.71 
    (1.01) (13.15) (-3.02) (-2.38)     
  R3 0.62 1.14 -0.07 0.12   0.77 
    (3.32)*** (9.74) (-0.49) (1.11)     
  R3-R1 0.45 0.34 0.17 0.33   0.21 
    (1.50) (2.46) (0.88) (2.24)     
DISP3 R1 -0.01 0.92 -0.23 -0.05   0.52 
    (-0.05) (5.70) (-1.85) (-0.29)     
  R3 0.60 0.96 0.57 0.52   0.65 
    (1.74)* (7.08) (3.17) (1.93)     
  R3-R1 0.61 0.04 0.80 0.57   0.26 
    (1.73)* (0.18) (4.69) (1.87)     
DISP3-
DISP1 R3-R1 0.61 -0.42 0.62 0.64   0.09 
    (1.11) (-1.20) (2.38) (1.47)     
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Table	  12.	  Crisis	  period	  time-­‐series	  regressions	  including	  Fama-­‐French	  (1993)	  three-­‐factor	  model	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  monthly	  excess	  returns	  for	  the	  momentum-­‐dispersion	  portfolios.	  R1	  is	  the	  loser	  portfolio,	  R2	  the	  medium	  portfolio	  and	  R3	  the	  winner	  portfolio.	  DISP1	  is	  the	  portfolio	  for	  stocks	  with	  low	  dispersion,	  DISP2	  for	  medium	  dispersion	  and	  DISP3	  for	  high	  dispersion	  of	  analyst	  forecasts.	  The	  parameters	  are	  estimated	  as	  follows:	  (Rpt	  −	  rft	  )	  =	  ap	  +	  bp	  (Rmt	  −	  rft	  )	  +	  sp	  SMBt	  +	  hp	  HMLt	  +	  ept	  .	  The	  intercept	  estimates	  are	  denoted	  as	  percentage	  points.	  T-­‐statistics	  are	  shown	  in	  parentheses.	  All	  regressions	  are	  Newey-­‐West	  (1987)	  corrected	  for	  heteroskedasticity	  and	  autocorrelation.	  
Dispersion Momentum Portfolio a b s h   Adj. R
2 
                
DISP1 R1 1.09 1.16 -0.04 0.43   0.77 
    (1.31) (7.15) (-0.10) (1.52)     
  R3 0.33 1.22 -0.70 1.19   0.91 
    (0.83) (9.84) (-2.35) (5.84)     
  R3-R1 -0.76 0.06 -0.66 0.75   0.25 
    (-0.98) (0.33) (-2.37) (2.07)     
DISP2 R1 0.33 0.78 0.11 0.20   0.88 
    (0.87) (12.38) (0.61) (1.81)     
  R3 -0.50 1.18 -0.09 0.31   0.97 
    (-1.38) (20.44) (-0.85) (3.14)     
  R3-R1 -0.82 0.40 -0.20 0.11   0.43 
    (-1.50) (4.54) (-1.02) (0.58)     
DISP3 R1 -0.28 0.91 0.04 -0.18   0.92 
    (-0.45) (10.35) (0.19) (-3.09)     
  R3 0.30 1.38 -0.91 0.26   0.64 
    (0.22) (9.12) (-2.27) (0.49)     
  R3-R1 0.57 0.47 -0.95 0.43   0.17 
    (0.47) (3.35) (-2.54) (0.79)     
DISP3-
DISP1 R3-R1 1.33 0.41 -0.29 -0.32   -0.09 
    (0.79) (1.57) (-0.59) (-0.39)     
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Table	  13.	  Post-­‐crisis	  time-­‐series	  regressions	  including	  Fama-­‐French	  (1993)	  three-­‐factor	  model	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  monthly	  excess	  returns	  for	  the	  momentum-­‐dispersion	  portfolios.	  R1	  is	  the	  loser	  portfolio,	  R2	  the	  medium	  portfolio	  and	  R3	  the	  winner	  portfolio.	  DISP1	  is	  the	  portfolio	  for	  stocks	  with	  low	  dispersion,	  DISP2	  for	  medium	  dispersion	  and	  DISP3	  for	  high	  dispersion	  of	  analyst	  forecasts.	  The	  parameters	  are	  estimated	  as	  follows:	  (Rpt	  −	  rft	  )	  =	  ap	  +	  bp	  (Rmt	  −	  rft	  )	  +	  sp	  SMBt	  +	  hp	  HMLt	  +	  ept	  .	  The	  intercept	  estimates	  are	  denoted	  as	  percentage	  points.	  T-­‐statistics	  are	  shown	  in	  parentheses.	  All	  regressions	  are	  Newey-­‐West	  (1987)	  corrected	  for	  heteroskedasticity	  and	  autocorrelation.	  
Dispersion Momentum Portfolio a b s h   Adj. R
2 
                
DISP1 R1 0.33 0.90 -0.06 0.13   0.71 
    (1.56) (11.38) (-0.48) (0.85)     
  R3 -0.55 1.36 0.05 0.84   0.80 
    (-1.85)* (12.16) (0.35) (4.07)     
  R3-R1 -0.88 0.46 0.11 0.71   0.50 
    (-2.67)*** (4.41) (0.75) (4.41)     
DISP2 R1 0.02 0.75 -0.07 -0.15   0.82 
    (0.13) (18.70) (-0.96) (-2.16)     
  R3 -0.65 1.22 0.15 0.39   0.89 
    (-2.33)** (14.44) (1.75) (4.45)     
  R3-R1 -0.67 0.46 0.22 0.54   0.54 
    (-1.83)* (4.79) (1.72) (5.13)     
DISP3 R1 0.02 0.70 -0.03 -0.12   0.65 
    (0.11) (8.92) (-0.34) (-1.23)     
  R3 -0.84 1.16 0.33 0.29   0.82 
    (-3.09)*** (14.83) (2.30) (1.90)     
  R3-R1 -0.86 0.46 0.36 0.40   0.44 
    (-2.42)** (4.10) (1.94) (2.62)     
DISP3-
DISP1 R3-R1 0.02 0.00 0.25 -0.31   0.00 
    (0.04) (-0.00) (1.05) (-1.35)     
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous studies have been able to establish a link between heterogeneous 
beliefs and momentum profits by introducing the former as a variable to 
rational or behavioral asset pricing models. The main objective of this study 
was to further examine the relationship between investors’ disagreement and 
return continuation by extending the empirical research to cover various 
different phases of the market. Both portfolio analysis and time-series 
regressions are used in this paper to test the relation in three different time 
periods. The time periods are separated as a sample split test to reflect pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods as realistically as possible to capture the 
effects of momentum crashes and up and down periods comprehensively. 
Similarly to Verardo (2009), I use dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as a measure 
of disagreement about a firm’s fundamentals. 
 
The study includes altogether five hypotheses. The first two were designed on 
the basis of previous research findings and concerned the performance of 
momentum strategy regardless of the state of the market as well as whether 
return autocorrelation in short-term cumulative individual stock returns is 
higher for stocks with a larger degree of heterogeneity of beliefs in all states of 
the market. According to the first hypothesis, Novy-Marx’s (2012) 12-7-1 
momentum strategy should be able to generate positive absolute returns 
regardless of the prevailing market condition. Portfolio analysis was performed 
separately for each research sub-period and the statistical evidence was soon 
found to insufficient or even contrary to the hypothesis. The most likely reason 
behind the contradictory findings is the presence of influence from two 
momentum crashes in the data, which reflects the findings of Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016) regarding the relatively faster rebound of loser stocks in the 
aftermath of a momentum crash. The second hypothesis was also rejected, as it 
was found that the presence of heterogeneity did not increase momentum 
profits during all sub-periods. The causal relationship between heterogenous 
beliefs and momentum profits was the most apparent during the pre-crisis 
period and reflected the findings of Verardo (2009). Further testing highlighted 
the state-dependent nature of the efficacy of the momentum-dispersion 
strategy. 
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The latter three hypotheses were ones that had not been previously tested in 
any other scientific study and considered whether differences in beliefs 
exacerbate return continuation during the three individual sub-periods. In other 
words, these hypotheses delve further into examining the state-dependency of 
momentum-dispersion returns. Interestingly, only the findings regarding the 
pre-crisis period mirrored those of Verardo’s (2009). Analysis on the pre-crisis 
data shows that the strategy was able to generate positive returns especially for 
the medium and high-dispersion portfolios, for which the spreads where 
statistically highly significant. The most logical conclusion is that, unlike the 
latter two sub-periods, the pre-crisis period was relatively free of adverse 
effects from momentum crashes. However, the third hypothesis was still 
rejected because the statistical difference between the low-dispersion and high-
dispersion spreads was not significant enough. 
 
The momentum-dispersion portfolios did not yield positive return during the 
crisis period, most likely due to adverse market conditions. Interesting findings 
emerge from the post-crisis period, as the loser portfolios generated the highest 
return. The returns were also highly statistically significant. The medium 
portfolios also generated statistically significant positive return. The winner 
portfolios also generated positive returns, but at a relatively lower rate and with 
less significance. Interestingly, the low-dispersion portfolios generated the most 
return as compared to the medium- and high-dispersion portfolios. The results 
are completely opposite to those of the pre-crisis period as well as the initial 
hypotheses. This is most likely due to the effect of a relatively faster and more 
robust rebound of loser stocks after a momentum crash (Asness & Moskowitz 
2016). Subsequently, the fourth and fifth hypotheses were both rejected. 
 
One of the key motivations behind this study was to examine how well a prior 
research paper with highly robust results could be replicated with modern data. 
As it turns out, the substantial changes in the reality of financial markets are 
reflected in the results of this study. The vastly different results are most likely 
due to the presence of momentum crash effects in the data, but could also 
indicate that the use of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for investors’ opinions is 
no longer straightforward, as many investors have begun to think differently 
about analysts’ recommendations after the financial crisis. As the world keeps 
changing at an increasing pace, it is more important than ever that financial 
research strives to keep up.  
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